Will Unions Make Us Less Professional?

I. The Dialectics of Organization

Opponents of faculty unionization and collective bargaining have a large assortment of arguments which, although typically not supported by any substantial evidence, are of sufficient merit to deserve close attention. Paul L. Dressel and William H. Faricy, in *Return to Responsibility*, have written what can be taken as a standard critique of unionism among professors.¹ To begin with, they say, unionism will create an unhealthy schism between professors and students and/or professors and administrators, and may even tarnish the professor's image in the public mind. Such disunity could occur even among unionized professors if, as is the case in the City University of New York, full-time and part-time professors are represented by two competitive, jealous unions. And if unity is an important dimension of a professional community, then a second and broader consequence of unionism is its alleged tendency to undermine "professional integrity." The issue of the supposed incompatibility between unionism and professionalism is one of complexity and is interpreted in different ways by the authors who have written on the subject. In the words of Dressel and Faricy:

The concept of professionalism as opposed to unionism dramatizes the freedom and equality conflict. Younger faculty members are coming to regard the appeal to professionalism as ritualistic, while some faculty who support collective bargaining see it as a way to maintain professional ideals that are being corrupted, distorted, and enfeebled. The issue is whether collective-bargaining activities are inconsistent with professional conduct and thus unbecoming to a member of the community of scholars, or whether such activity is necessary in order to establish

¹Bibliographic information for this and other citations is given on page 14.

Professor Faia pays his dues at William and Mary, where he is now completing a volume on college and university faculty members. He wishes to thank the Computer Center of the College of William and Mary for the use of data processing facilities.
economic equality and protect jobs. Nowhere is the conflict between professionalism and collective bargaining more clearly drawn than in the question of the strike.

One variant of this argument holds that, while there is no necessary incompatibility between the role of a unionist and the role of a professional, the professional who joins a union tends to undermine the public image of his professionalism. In the long run, such a stripping away of popular esteem would redound to the detriment of professors as professionals. That, the public generally, and academic employers in particular, would soon fall into the habit of treating faculty members as factory hands. Eventually, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, professors would begin acting accordingly or, at least, would encounter extreme difficulty in trying to maintain professional standards. In a sense, then, there are two interlocking arguments that seek to fault unionism by asserting its incompatibility with professional integrity: the first holds that unionism tends to be associated with a low professional self-image and low standards of professional conduct; the second, that unionism tends to produce a low public image regarding professionalism, which may eventuate in a low self-image. Both arguments imply a negative relationship between unionism and professional standards.

The validity of such arguments cannot be assessed in the absence of consensus about what constitutes professionalism. The National Labor Relations Act, for instance, contains what appears to be a highly precise definition of “professional employee,” as follows:

(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes.

And yet, much is left out: nothing is said about “peer evaluation,” about a “professional self-image,” about how a professional relates to various kinds of “clients,” about whether a given level of academic certification (e.g., the Ph.D.) may be deemed essential to the proper exercise of professional responsibilities. Critics of unionization among academic employees have not lost sight of these myriad dimensions of professionalism; indeed, the typical critic uses the tactic of enumerating all conceivable dimensions of professionalism, and then hypothesizing that unionization, ultimately, will be incompatible either with all these dimensions or with some combination of them. An appropriate response by supporters of unionization, then, would consist not merely in raising questions about such hypotheses, but also in challenging what may be a far too broad definition of professionalism. For instance, would it really undermine the professional standards of academicians if they were to share with students the responsibility for designing curricula?
A 1969 survey of 60,028 college and university faculty members, undertaken by the Carnegie Commission and the American Council on Education, provided a substantial amount of information about professional standards and union sentiment. For instance, professors who belong to the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) are slightly more likely than their colleagues to emphasize a broad liberal education as opposed to specialized training, and to consider themselves intellectuals. On the other hand, AFT professors are slightly less likely than their colleagues to be involved in communication with other specialists in their fields, and they are less likely to publish articles in academic journals. Somewhat the same pattern emerges when we examine collective bargaining attitudes or strike sentiment in relation to these several measures of professionalism. Professors who support collective bargaining and the strike tactic are more likely than other professors to define themselves as "intellectuals." There is a weak, practically nonexistent, relationship between attitudes on collective bargaining or the strike and involvement in research. The tendency for AFT members to have relatively less involvement in research and publication appears to be due primarily to the fact that most large, effective AFT chapters are found at colleges and universities in which little research is carried on. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the relationship between union membership and this aspect of professionalism at specific types of institutions. The procedure makes it clear that the "incompatibility" of union membership and research productivity exists almost entirely at the high quality, high prestige universities where most of the research takes place.

In an article on faculty unions, Everett C. Ladd and Seymour M. Lipset develop an elaborate set of hypotheses about several factors that allegedly influence union sentiment among academicians. "Professors of low scholarly achievements," they find, "give greater backing to the principles of collective bargaining than do their more productive colleagues." In addition, "liberal to left" professors were found to be "much more pro-union than their conservative colleagues," a relationship that is said to obtain "at all types of institutions and in all age and achievement groupings." And herein lies a paradox: how can scholarly involvement discourage unionism while liberalism strengthens it, when there is a strong association between scholarly productivity and a liberal political outlook? As Lipset and Ladd have pointed out many times, "faculty of high scholarly standing show up . . . as more supportive of a liberal-left, 'progressive,' and egalitarian politics than their less highly achieving colleagues." Ladd and Lipset try to explain this anomaly in two ways: first, by showing that "ideology" has a very large impact on unionism, while the "quality" of one's institution has a relatively small impact; secondly, by arguing that "highly achieving academics . . . are significantly cross-pressured with regard to faculty unionism: their liberalism would incline them to support it; but their objective interests and the general structure of their academic values bring them into opposition. And . . . the latter considerations typically prove decisive."

When subjected to a more detailed statistical analysis, Ladd and Lipset's speculations turn out to be untenable. First, it should be noted that Ladd and Lipset provide no evidence for the italicized portion of the generalization quoted above: it remains to be seen whether professors subject to cross pressures of the kind
described tend to reconcile those pressures by adopting an anti-union posture. Secondly, professors of high scholarly eminence, although they do indeed tend to be of a liberal political outlook, are often surprisingly illiberal with regard to issues “within the cloisters” such as academic reform or “student power,” and this small streak of illiberality may well apply to the issue of faculty unions. Lipset himself, in an effort to resolve a similar paradox, once made a distinction between “economic” and “non-economic” liberalism: perhaps a distinction between “academic” and “non-academic” liberalism would also be in order. Finally, and most importantly, the evidence indicates that there is no incompatibility between scholarly productivity and attitudes favoring unionism. Indeed, when other factors are taken into account, there is a slight tendency for high levels of scholarly achievement to be associated with an increase in support for faculty unions.

Ladd and Lipset’s analysis attempts to separate the effects of class factor (e.g., age, salary, scholarly involvement) from ideological factors (e.g., liberalism, attitudes toward student activism) as determinants of support for unionization. An essential part of their argument is that, at the more prestigious institutions, a high degree of scholarly eminence tends to impede unionization, while “liberalism” tends to support it. Empirical data clearly indicate that while the latter part of this generalization is valid, the first part is not. At every type of institution, ideological factors such as support for campus activism, leftism, and support for academic reform strengthen one’s commitment to unionization, while age, salary, and scholarly achievement—the “class” factors—have little impact. In most instances, in fact, scholarly achievement has a slight positive impact on support for unionization. At the high quality universities where, according to Ladd and Lipset, scholarly productivity is sharply incompatible with union support, the very opposite tends to be true: the more productive scholars have a slight tendency to favor unionization. These results are highly encouraging for those who wish to organize professors on the basis of their broad political convictions rather than their “class” position. As a final observation it should be noted that, although most faculty unions are found at the least prestigious institutions, there is actually little variation in attitude toward unionism from one type of institution to the next.

On the whole, then, the Carnegie/ACE data show that, while most relationships between unionism and professionalism are very weak at best, nevertheless those professors committed to unionism in the sense of belonging to AFT, supporting collective bargaining, supporting the strike as a possible tactic, or supporting “unionism” in general, clearly do not have lower professional standards, under our provisional definition, than those who oppose unionism. If anything, such professors have higher professional standards. Our provisional definition, of course, may turn out not to be highly conventional. One could easily take exception to the definition of a highly professional academician as one who sees himself as an intellectual, emphasizes a broad, liberal education, publishes heavily, etc. In addition, one could argue that we have left out some important dimensions of professionalism, such as a belief in the importance of peer evaluation and control of a professional’s behavior. We shall see later in this article that professors who
believe in unionism tend also to believe that their peers—other professors—should share the power of evaluation with students. On this criterion, then, professors who support unionism would score low on professionalism. The practice of regarding students as "clients" rather than "colleagues" or "peers," however, is a highly questionable one, and until that issue is resolved it is almost meaningless to raise the question of whether a belief in "student power" is incompatible with the professional's concept of peer evaluation and control. Perhaps the major upshot of this discussion is that it will remain difficult to resolve the problem of the alleged incompatibility of unionism and professionalism until we arrive at a wider consensus as to what constitutes professionalism in the academic world.

II. The Specter of Standardization

Uniformity is widely lamented in academic circles. Among professors anything that smacks of homogenization, bureaucratization, or redundancy is given short shrift—at least verbally. Because they are trained for "straight" thinking rather than "stoned" thinking, professors tend to concentrate on the differences among things rather than the similarities. Furthermore, they sometimes attempt to create or enhance differences: they believe it is essential to rank students on academic performance; they believe the distinctions among assistant, associate, and full professors make sense; they believe in the existence of faculty salary disparities ranging from, say, $10,000 to $40,000; they believe that a good university contains a wide diversity of schools and colleges, that a good college offers a wide variety of programs, and that a good department offers a wide variety of courses. All such assumptions, as it turns out, are eminently debatable.

Given this predilection toward "diversity," it is not at all surprising that straight thinkers such as Dressel and Faricy should become apprehensive that faculty unions will undermine "departmental autonomy" and thereby create a rancorous uniformity. A high degree of uniformity, they say,

will probably develop in salary patterns that are based upon degrees, rank, and years of service. Uniformity leaves no room for merit recognition and hence no incentive for a faculty member to do more than is required. Typically the quality of departments has varied greatly across a university, but enforced uniformity in salaries is likely to bring all to the same level of distinction—or mediocrity.

There are several good answers to that argument. First, what is sacrosanct about departmental autonomy? Faculty autonomy does not necessitate departmental autonomy. Gus Tyler, for instance, writes about the existence of powerful autonomous faculty unions during the Middle Ages, an era in which the departmental system had not yet been conjured up in the mind of any man. Secondly, to what extent are contemporary academic departments in fact autonomous? (Let that question remain rhetorical!) Thirdly, unionism does not preclude (although perhaps it should) substantial variation in salaries, the differential rewarding of "merit," and a host of perquisites, privileges, and immunities in the absence of which faculty members would find life a lot less exasperating and entertaining. In addition, there are many varieties of uniformity. Uniformity of salaries is one
thing; uniformity of educational philosophies, course content, classroom procedures, and evaluative techniques is something altogether different. In a normal academic career one encounters scores of men and women (even on non-union campuses!) who feel that the major difficulty with higher education today is that—to repeat a typical example—it permits the total anarchy of a multi-sectioned course in which each professor is free to choose his own textbook! There is no reason, of course, why faculty unions cannot support and promulgate an experimental attitude; the creation of such an attitude, in fact, should be one of their major goals.

Under prevailing conditions some departments do have sufficient autonomy, even when presumably constrained by union contracts, that they are able to commit the following excesses lucidly described by Dressel and Faricy:

> For those [professors] not on continuing contract, appointments must be made for a full year, and dismissal after the first year must be supported by unsatisfactory evaluations for two of the previous three semesters. The effect is that frequently lecturers are routinely given unsatisfactory ratings, to protect departments from having to offer them a continuing contract. The department chairman is in the unhappy position of having to initiate unsatisfactory ratings on faculty members who are performing satisfactorily.

And then, in ironic juxtaposition:

> Although in many universities, tenure is often restricted because of the need to limit the size of the tenured faculty, prevent inbreeding, or maintain a proper range of specialties in the tenured faculty, still, departmental autonomy is restricted when such decisions can be regarded as a grievance.

The exercise of “departmental autonomy” through the manipulation and deliberate falsification of performance ratings in the interest of bureaucratic expediency is precisely the sort of barbarity the unions are designed to stop. Such actions should become grievances; in a union of professional men, they must become grievances. Dressel and Faricy may lament the fact that “insistence upon publicly presentable and defensible evidence might result in failure to make critical and probably controversial decisions,” but if the evidence is not presentable and defensible then no adverse decision should be taken. And, we hasten to add, departmental actions based on evidence that is neither presentable nor defensible are not invariably taken in pursuit of greater diversity.

Ladd and Lipset’s position on “standardization” is similar to that of Dressel and Faricy. Unionization, they claim, “inevitably fosters policies that seek to eliminate salary differentials among those in a given job category, other than those linked to seniority,” and such policies, it is alleged, “... will probably serve more to downgrade the relative standing of the high achievers ... than to bring the lesser ones up to the level of their more affluent competitors.” In explaining the relative “lack of support for faculty unionism” at major colleges and universities—a generalization for which the evidence is not at all convincing—Ladd and Lipset claim that “the more research-oriented culture of academe is inherently meritocratic. Faculty are rewarded with tenure, promotions, and salaries from within, and by research grants and honorific rewards from without, according to judg-
ments made about their scholarly activities. There is an important clash, then, between the interests and values of achieving academics and the normative system of trade unionism.” These arguments parallel those of Dressel and Faricy in their uncritical acceptance of one of the leading idols of the academic tribe: that there is a close commensurability between merit and reward. We have presented substantial evidence elsewhere showing that many alleged measures of merit have little impact on salaries. Furthermore, the “merit system” typically operates in secrecy, so that it is usually impossible for individual faculty members to determine whether their own “merit” is reflected in the rewards conferred on them. Ladd and Lipset’s claim that salary standardization will tend to “downgrade” those who are currently “high achievers” (whatever that means) is apparently based on the untenable hypothesis that the anticipation of reward motivates faculty members to cultivate merit. Dressel and Faricy implicitly accept the same hypothesis when they assert that standardization would eliminate the “incentive for a faculty member to do more than is required.” Again, empirical research on this matter indicates that the number of factors that influence faculty salaries is so large, and the salary determination process itself so submerged in secrecy, that the typical faculty member is rarely in a position to determine whether his efforts have brought forth a just reward. It may well be that the absence of such knowledge produces the empirical finding (in my own research) of a lack of relationship between anticipated rewards and the cultivation of merit. On the other hand, it is quite possible that professors derive a much larger part of their motivation to excel from their own professional goals and standards than they do from the anticipation of financial reward or high professorial rank; this may be particularly true of professors committed to unionization, whose professional standards, as we have seen, are unexcelled. It is one of the myriad ironies of academia that tenure arrangements are rarely criticized by champions of the “merit system,” even though tenure clearly reduces any “incentive” a faculty member may feel to strive for job security. Critics of tenure, on the other hand, often attempt to buttress their arguments with the claim that the assurance of continuous employment, because it removes an incentive, leads professors to “slack off.” But, again, the small amount of evidence available on this issue indicates that, other matters (age, years of experience, degrees held, etc.) held constant, tenured professors perform the teaching function (as assessed by students) just as well as non-tenured professors.

It may be true, as Robert K. Carr and Daniel K. VanEyck argue in their Collective Bargaining Comes to the Campus, that “collective bargaining has long been recognized as exerting a leveling influence.” In this context, however, leveling refers primarily to a reduction of economic differentials; it does not necessarily imply reduced opportunities for experimentation with curricula, classroom procedures, evaluation techniques, various forms of university governance, and so forth. All such issues are eminently bargainable, and astute faculty unions could well ensure increased variability in a wide range of activities. Unionization, in fact, does not even preclude the existence of a “merit” system: Carr and VanEyck explain that the unionization of symphony orchestras has not altogether eliminated a system of differential rewards for “stars” and for those
who occupy the first few chairs of each section of an orchestra. The mere fact, however, that we can have a merit system does not mean that we must have a merit system.

Furthermore, there is a major contradiction in the position of those critics of unionization who, on the one hand, have argued against standardization, but who also have lamented the possibility that a narrow definition of bargaining units—e.g., separating full-time from part-time faculty, professional from semi-professional employees, etc.—will tend to create "fragmentation." The critics cannot have it both ways: fragmentation arising from narrow definitions of bargaining units will tend to produce diversity as each bargaining unit pursues its own interests unhindered by any need to sell its position to a wider constituency. Collective bargaining is expensive, and a variety of contracts negotiated by various constituencies will increase costs substantially, but such variety, one hopes, will tend to prevent the more onerous forms of standardization.

Insofar as "accountability" produces standardization, faculty unions may become a major bulwark against standardization. The upsurge of cost-benefit analysis will probably give strong impetus to the faculty unionization movement. Arguments against faculty unions, as we have seen, usually begin with the assumption that unionization is somehow incompatible with the professional status of college and university teachers, and that it would somehow damage a benign public image cultivated over many decades. This argument rarely pauses to raise questions about the strength of professional attitudes among those professors who do in fact join unions; nor is it concerned with whether their "militance" may be in part a reaction against perceived threats to professional standards. Among high school teachers, militance and unionization are often an affirmation of professional standards which are thought to be threatened by, say, creeping bureaucracy and a rigid adherence to rules and arbitrary procedures on the part of principals and other supervisors. Ronald G. Corwin's survey of "militant" high school teachers showed that:

... teaching must, by the very nature of professionalization, achieve more authority over the policies that govern its work. But school systems are bureaucracies designed to control and standardize work and otherwise constrain the authority of employees. Militancy is the expected outcome of this clash between what are essentially competing principles of organization integral to organizations themselves.

Corwin offers some provocative speculations about the social forces that underlie both bureaucratization and increasing teacher militancy in pursuit of "professional" goals:

... in contrast to the picture of red tape and control so often evoked by the term "bureaucracy," ... autonomy, tension, and conflict are at least as characteristic of modern organizations as rules and supervision. The paradox is that even as society becomes more highly organized, conflict appears to be increasing. ...

It would be hard to find a more perfect summary of recent trends within the universities, where the increasing emphasis on "accountability" as a partial means of discouraging endemic conflict apparently has given strong impetus to faculty
Bureaucratization is one of the most important devices employed by administrators to keep conflict from getting out of control. The harried administrator will be quick to invoke “accountability”, he will insist that all staff and line relations be sharply defined, and that a “codification committee” make it perfectly clear who has authority, under given circumstances, over whom; he will insist that lines of authority not only be unambiguous, but that they be frequently exercised through the practice of making reports to one’s superiors or otherwise showing the appropriate deference. But such an administrative style often encounters strong resistance; and if an authoritarian bureaucrat responds to resistance by becoming more authoritarian, we witness the explosive dynamic of a vicious circle, producing a rapid escalation. Among Corwin’s high school teachers such escalation processes were not uncommon, and it is reasonable to suppose that similar processes could occur among college teachers. A recent study by Peter M. Blau, in fact, indicates that the larger, more prestigious colleges and universities are freer of the rigidities of bureaucracy than the smaller, less prominent institutions. If the recent emphasis on “accountability” and cost-benefit economics filters up to the more prestigious institutions, unionization efforts at such institutions probably will receive strong impetus and it may become possible to “translate attitudes into behavior”—attitudes which, as we have seen, are as favorable toward unionization as those which prevail at the “lower-tier” institutions.

Ladd and Lipset repeatedly allude to the alleged incompatibility of unionism and professionalism, and in so doing they continually commit the “ecological fallacy,” i.e., they assume, in a classic non-sequitur, that since unions have caught on primarily at “lower tier” institutions, they must necessarily be most attractive to the least professional faculty members. “If there is a link,” they claim, “between the independence and high status of the professions and hostility to the spirit of unionism . . ., then the current growth of faculty unionism would seem to indicate that the professoriate is becoming ‘less professional’. . .” In a later context, we read that “college teaching at places of low academic standing less resembles a profession, so faculty in such positions thereby see less of a clash between their status and the norms of unionism.” Again, a few pages later: “The least professional—i.e., ‘profession-like’—sectors of academe are the most supportive of faculty unions.” While usage of the terms “professional” and “profession-like” is highly ambiguous, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Ladd and Lipset have fallen into the trap of assuming that, since unionism has caught on most strongly at institutions where there are relatively few opportunities for “professional” development and where the encroachments of bureaucracy are often perceived as a threat to professionalism, there must be a corresponding lack of professionalism at such institutions on the part of faculty members who support unions. It is hard to find any other interpretation for the statement that the growth of unionism indicates that faculty members have become less professional. An alternative hypothesis holds that unionization at the less prestigious institutions is most likely to be supported by those faculty members who have the highest professional standards and the strongest instigation toward improving their professional status,
i.e., faculty members who perceive the lack of opportunity and the encroachments of bureaucracy as a deplorable condition. Such an alternative hypothesis has the virtue of being consistent with data indicating that unionized faculty members are more likely to define themselves as "intellectuals" and to be committed to a "broad liberal education" as opposed to "specialized training"; it is consistent with the finding that, insofar as scholarly involvement has any direct impact on unionism, it tends to be in a positive direction; it is consistent with Corwin's studies of militance among secondary school teachers, a militance so bound up with high professional standards that Corwin calls it "militant professionalism"; it is even consistent, finally, with Ladd and Lipset's speculation that unionization is motivated, in part, by increased "bureaucratization" of higher education which has "reduced the sense of collegiality between faculty and administrators," and by "the fact that teachers at lower-tier institutions typically have less of the independence and self-regulation associated with being members of a profession; that they have less personal standing and bargaining power; and that they are not nearly so well appointed in salary and various perquisites of academic life." The "professional standards" of individuals faculty members, in other words, cannot be inferred from the standards implicit in the structures and procedures that surround and constrain them—such an inference commits the ecological fallacy. Faculty members may be genuinely dissatisfied with their surroundings largely because of their lofty professional standards. It should be noted, finally, that there is some dissension among faculty members as to what constitutes high professional standards; the final section of this article, in fact, argues that the most important task of faculty unions is that of finding new ways of defining professional standards and professional responsibilities.

The possibility that faculty unions, in part, result from perceived threats to professional standards has not been lost on the more perceptive scholars in the field. J. W. Garbarino, professor of business administration at Berkeley and an expert on collective bargaining, questions the thesis that the popularity of unionism at less prestigious institutions is due solely to the fact that individual faculty members at such institutions have low professional standards:

Despite this pattern, some skepticism as to the significance of the quality variable as an explanation of the incidence of unionism is in order. Not only is quality difficult to define and measure, but it appears likely that it is a proxy for a range of other variables which explain the propensity to organize. That is, the popular explanation for the inverse association of quality and unionism rests on the values of professionalism or similar attributes. We suspect, however, that other variables more directly related to the environment and working conditions of faculty (e.g., the degree of participation in governance, work load, and other elements of status and privilege) are likely to be more enduring explanations.

And in Sanford Kadish's opinion, even the strike tactic may be justifiable in situations where faculty members have been victimized by a massive assault upon their professional standards. Finally, William B. Boyd, a college president, recognizes that faculty unions may be a way of restoring a lost autonomy:

A fourth cause for unionization is the search for new means of asserting professional power in areas where faculty tend to be losing to outside forces. When
universities were autonomous or ignored by the public, faculties could work out power equations on campus through traditional academic means. For the most part this meant contests with the administration and, recently, with student demands for a share in decisions which were once the prerogative of faculties. These familiar battlefields of power are no longer the most important ones. The development of statewide systems, of new bureaucracies designed to control higher education, has made serious inroads into the independence of universities and the authority formerly accorded faculties. This threat to institutional autonomy has helped stimulate professorial interest in organization for collective power.

It may turn out, in other words, that unionism and professionalism are complementary, not incompatible. Such a conclusion would not be unprecedented: a favorite indoor sport among academicians is that of ascertaining, enumerating, and promulgating an awareness of all the activities allegedly precluded if one has received the call to become a scholar, and as often as not these alleged incompatibilities turn out to be spurious. Thus, it is said that if you wish to be a scholar, you cannot become a political activist; if you wish to be a scholar, you cannot be heavily involved in religion—witness the famous studies of fifty years ago by James Leuba; if you wish to be a scholar, you must forswear all romantic involvements with students; if you wish to be a scholar, chances are you will not be a good teacher—if you publish, you may not perish, but your teaching surely will. In my own empirical researches I have examined, thus far, the relationship between religious involvement and scholarly productivity, and there is no incompatibility. Hopefully, it will come as good news to the counterculture that one can indulge in irrational thought patterns and still be a successful scholar, even a successful scientist. Similarly, the more productive scholars are more likely to have received awards for good teaching. Among a dozen empirical studies of this relationship, only one showed even a small degree of incompatibility between good teaching and good scholarship. Finally, I offer the hypothesis that political involvement does not preclude good scholarship, and that it is possible to teach the profoundest lessons to students with whom one is romantically involved. We may not be able to grade such students objectively, but, as I’ve argued elsewhere, grading and good teaching are incompatible.

III. A Needed Transformation

It will come as a surprise to nobody to hear that, in recent decades, unions have become meek, mild, and manageable. But this change is an integral part of a much larger change toward a new form of industrial society. In his remarkable book *The New Industrial State*, John Kenneth Galbraith has shown that Marxists commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness when they speak of the pervasive internal contradictions of the American industrial system. On the other hand, contradictions involving the integration of the industrial system with other sectors of society, as well as contradictions at the international level (the latter totally ignored by Galbraith), are a whole new can of worms, and Marxists should have little difficulty in accepting the premise that the internal contradictions of the American industrial system merely have been displaced to the supra-industrial or international level. It is arguable, and Galbraith so argues, that the politico-
military-industrial sector of American society, the dominant sector, is indeed a smoothly functioning machine. The supply of capital is largely controlled by the corporations that use it; a vast “technostructure” provides the needed technical expertise and managerial guidance to make the corporations eminently adaptable; “workers” at all levels are taught to “identify” with the corporation employing them and with the manifest goals of the corporate system; prices and markets (aggregate demand) are thoroughly managed with the full cooperation of government; universities have been transformed into manpower channeling agencies and research and development departments. These, then, are the essential structural contours of the emerging industrial system, and the unions are now chiefly of value to the system insofar as they contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of these norms. And contribute they do: by “helping to frame the rules and by participating in their administration”; by “helping to prevent discontent and, therewith, a sense of alienation”; by “aiding the accommodation of technological change”; by assuming “the principal role of winning approval of the policy of regulating aggregate demand”; by helping to “standardize wage costs between different industrial firms and to insure that changes in wages will occur at approximately the same time.” If the corporations did not have unions, they surely would have to invent them.

The advantages of such unions—Galbraith calls them “ministerial” unions because their limited authority is delegated by higher powers—have not been lost on the more perceptive college and university administrators; the danger, then, is that newly emerging faculty unions will be readily co-opted by those charged with the management of educational institutions. The avoidance of co-optation will necessitate efforts to sustain a high level of militance, a conflict orientation, and an evolving set of demands perceived as exorbitant by administration. Hopefully, the demands will evolve by becoming broader in scope. The Carnegie/ACE survey provides some encouraging findings on the capacity of professors devoted to unionism to define their goals in ways that go beyond economics. Comparing professors who support unionism with those who do not, we found very small differences in attitudes concerning salary matters. Forty-seven percent of the AFT members, for instance, consider their salaries “poor” or “fair,” compared with forty-five percent of the non-members; disgruntlement over salaries, then, does not distinguish between members and non-members of AFT. We saw earlier that salaries have little impact on attitudes toward unionization. On the other hand, among AFT members twenty-four percent are dissatisfied with teaching loads, compared with thirteen percent among non-members; in addition, AFT members are substantially more concerned about administrative “autocracy” within departments than are non-members.

Future generations of professors, one hopes, will insist that faculty unions begin playing down the traditional economic issues in favor of a host of newly emerging issues vastly more significant than bread and butter. The “futurology” industry has assured us for many years that the more advanced industrial societies are entering a new era in which incredible technological advances will transform the social and psychological foundations of our existence. Alvin Toffler’s *Future Shock* warns that if we do not prepare ourselves for these inevitable transforma-
tions we will begin to suffer on a massive scale the adverse symptoms of severe psychological stress and "information overload." Future shock is the temporal counterpart of culture shock, a severe emotional affliction suffered by those who travel to foreign lands and expose themselves to a strange culture too abruptly or without an adequate prior knowledge of what to expect and how to adapt to it. Such anticipatory knowledge is allegedly the university's business; experimentation with future life styles could also become the university's business. And yet, while history departments are found nearly everywhere, futurology departments—or even serious programs—are practically unheard of, and universities, in Toffler's view, remain full of anachronisms:

... the whole idea of assembling masses of students (raw material) to be processed by teachers (workers) in a centrally located school (factory) was a stroke of industrial genius. The whole administrative hierarchy of education, as it grew up, followed the model of industrial bureaucracy. The very organization of knowledge into permanent disciplines was grounded on industrial assumptions. Children marched from place to place and sat in assigned stations. Bells rang to announce changes to time.

The inner life of the school thus became an anticipatory mirror, a perfect introduction to industrial society. The most criticized features of education today—the regimentation, lack of individualization, the rigid systems of seating, grouping, grading and marking, the authoritarian role of the teacher—are precisely those that made mass public education so effective an instrument of adaptation for its place and time.

At a time when students should be deciding whether Shulamith Firestone, in *The Dialectic of Sex*, is correct in asserting that (1) pregnancy is barbaric, (2) gestation within artificial environments is the wave of the future, and (3) parenthood, as we know it, is not, those who run universities are still agonizing about whether the university should continue the farce of trying to play an *in loco parentis* role vis-a-vis young adults who are sophisticated enough to read Shulamith Firestone. At a time when knowledge, especially technical knowledge, is outmoded almost before it is disseminated, we are still tinkering with a nineteenth-century curriculum. Even the word "curriculum" is ironic: coming from the Latin word meaning "a running," it now carries a connotation of being a static, sterile body of knowledge which each student must try to ingest whole. Prevailing classroom techniques are informed mainly by the pedagogy of the Middle Ages, when the master possessed the only book; even print culture, which Marshall McLuhan years ago pronounced passé, has not yet fully arrived in the college classroom where it is a common practice for the professor to assign a book which he does not use at all or which he does use in a way that suggests that he still sees himself as a medieval schoolmaster who possesses the only copy. And finally the grading system, which involves parents, pressure, and prodigious labor, is fully as barbaric as pregnancy.

Faculty unions should develop positions on these sorts of issues, speak out forcefully, and back up their propaganda with action.

On the other hand, one way in which professorial unions might profitably emulate industrial unions (as described by Galbraith) is by taking steps to expand "effective demand" for their services. Not the least lamentable feature of
contemporary higher education is the fact that, at any given time, the recipients of its services are almost entirely white, middle-class, between ages seventeen and twenty-one, and intent on being properly certified. (Certification, of course, is largely a device for increasing aggregate demand, but it is hopefully not the sort of device that will be advocated by the ideal professors' union.) Although one hates to see professors become involved in advertising, it would not be indecorous for the academic profession to point out in a massive public relations campaign (for which management would be expected to pick up the tab) that it is selling a commodity that, unlike Coca-Cola or the latest fastback or Galbraith's toaster that prints monograms on your toast, is indispensable and should therefore be made readily available to everybody including the non-affluent, the non-white, the non-young, and the non-urban. Even the "non-literate" and the "non-educable." It may be necessary, on occasion, that the campus be taken where the people are, but even medical doctors in the early days of their unionization efforts were not unaccustomed to making house calls. Assuming that a few automobiles could be wrestled away from the athletic departments, there is no reason why professors could not take their services to the hinterlands as a part of a serious "continuing education" program. The next logical step, of course, would be for professors to gain a modicum of control over admission policies and to take measures necessary to eliminate the spurious motivations for attending college created by the "certification game." Like abolishing many, if not most, degrees. Such winsome faculty unions as these would address themselves almost entirely to non-economic issues and therefore presumably would receive the plaudits even of the staid and proper American Association of University Professors, which has only recently decided, due to popular demand of its constituency, that serious faculty unions may well be a force worth co-opting—as long as they keep the primary focus on non-economic issues such as academic freedom.

References

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